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Inequality, Social Cooperation and Local Collective Action 
Patricia Justino 
Summary 
 
This paper examines the relationship between inequality and collective action, and identifies 
a range of mechanisms that shape the association between income inequality and local 
collective action. These include (i) individual motivations to participate in collective action 
groups, (ii) group-level cooperation and trust, and (iii) the efficiency and coordination of 
collective organisations. The paper proposes in addition an agenda for future research on the 
links between inequality, social cooperation and collective action. 
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Introduction 
Economic development is typically accompanied by a certain level of inequality: different 
people have different abilities and different initial endowments of physical, human and social 
capital. However, inequalities are also shaped by a variety of structural factors and social, 
economic and political disparities ranging from the uneven distribution of opportunities, 
resources and power across society, to colonial legacies and other historical and institutional 
processes. These inequalities are often associated with the exclusion of some population 
groups from the benefits of development, and may pose constraints on the establishment of 
fully functioning market economies and democratic political systems. There is mounting 
evidence that vulnerable groups have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic 
growth in many countries in the world. High rates of urbanisation have, in addition, resulted in 
the proliferation of slums and large areas where state presence is minimal. Recent global 
developments including the Arab Spring events, food riots and the Occupy movement have 
highlighted the rise of these forms of inequality across the world, while academic research 
has shown evidence for dramatic increases in the incomes and wealth shares of those at the 
top of the distribution (Piketty 2013), and in overall material disparities between the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’ (Milanovic 2011). 
There is a large literature across the social sciences on the causes and consequences of 
different forms of inequality. The general consensus is that equality matters not only for its 
impacts on economic development but also as a normative good (Sen 1973; Rawls 1971). A 
large body of literature has shown that high levels of persistent inequality affect negatively 
the functioning of markets, the accumulation of human capital and sociopolitical stability. 
Equality and social justice are also goals shared across most societies. This paper discusses 
one critical effect of inequality that has remained largely under-researched: on forms of 
collective action, i.e. on how people come together (or not) to achieve common societal 
goals. 
Much has also been written about the role of collective action and civil society organisations 
in addressing social, economic and political inequalities throughout history (e.g. Paige 1975; 
Scott 1976). A large literature has examined the impact of collective action on addressing 
inequalities through demands for redistributive policies (e.g. Boix 2003). Justino (2006, 2007, 
2015) shows how government transfers have been associated with reductions in civil unrest 
in India motivated by social discontent and demands for redistribution. Labour unions, in 
particular, have played active roles in the reduction of inequalities through their influence on 
local job practices undertaken by public and private enterprises, and lobbying for the 
interests of otherwise disadvantaged groups in the design of national policies (see Freeman 
and Medoff 1984). Other important collective action organisations include user committees in 
the management of common resources, local credit groups, village committees for the 
management and provision of public goods, self-help groups and agricultural cooperatives. 
Bringing about more equal opportunities and outcomes requires organised action: in order to 
work, collective organisations need to rely on the participation of and cooperation between 
different segments of society, to benefit from efficient communication channels, and to be 
able to voice actively the demands of those they represent. This is not straightforward. In 
particular, inequalities within heterogeneous groups and asymmetries in bargaining power 
may limit social cooperation and interactions and, thus, the functioning and effectiveness of 
collective action (Baland and Platteau 2006; Banerjee, Mookherjee, Munshi and Ray 2001; 
Bardhan 2005). This is a particularly important challenge in developing countries where local 
forms of collective action have been heralded as a way of breaking development barriers 
(World Bank 2000, 2004), particularly in areas where state institutions are weak or inefficient 
(Ostrom 1990). 
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The relationship between inequality and collective action has received increasing attention in 
the development literature, notably in research concerned with the management of common 
property resources (see Baland, Bardhan and Bowles 2006). But collective action is also 
important for a variety of other development outcomes beyond common resources, including 
access to credit, insurance and the exercise of citizenship rights. This paper attempts to shed 
some light on the relationship between inequality and local collective action by making use of 
emerging literature on these complex relationships. The paper focuses on mapping out and 
discussing the mechanisms that may shape the association between income inequality and 
local collective action. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the importance of income inequality for development. Section 3 discusses three key 
mechanisms that underlie a potential relationship between inequality and collective action: 
individual motivations to participate in collective action groups, group-level cooperation and 
trust, and the efficiency and coordination of collective organisations. Section 4 concludes the 
paper by outlining an agenda for future research on the links between inequality, social 
cooperation and collective action. 
1 Why does inequality matter for 
development? 
The analysis of inequality has recently taken on a central role in the development debate due 
to the increase in income inequality observed in a significant number of industrialised and 
developing countries (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010; Milanovic 2002, 2011; Oxfam 2014; 
Piketty 2013). An extensive literature has shown that a large number of individuals and 
households remain poor and excluded from the benefits of economic development due to the 
persistence of high levels of economic, social and political inequality. They remain poor not 
necessarily because they live in poor countries – in fact much poverty and social exclusion 
persists in high-income economies – but because high levels of inequality create exclusion 
and pockets of persistent poverty among certain population groups (Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff 
2006; World Bank 2003b). 
High levels of income inequality are typically correlated with forms of social, economic and 
political exclusion, and with both the structure and the level of poverty in any given society 
(Ravallion 2005 2013). Its impact can be direct, when it affects how households and 
individuals access economic (markets, employment), social (education, health) and political 
(voting, political organisations) institutions. Or it can have an indirect impact by affecting the 
type and rate of economic growth in a given economy and, consequently, the income and 
consumption levels of different population groups. The ineffectiveness of economic growth in 
reducing poverty in high-inequality countries has been well documented (Birdsall and 
Londoño 1997; Ravallion 1997). A body of influential literature has also provided ample 
evidence of the harmful effects of inequality on economic growth via several channels. 
One important channel is the implementation of efficient macroeconomic management 
policies. In general, the higher the initial level of inequality, the higher the negative impact of 
price fluctuations and other monetary variables (for instance, interest rates) on economic 
development, and the more limited will be the scope for the implementation of non-
distortionary monetary and fiscal policies (Gottschalk 2003). On the one hand, the higher the 
inequality of incomes and assets, the higher the number of economically vulnerable 
individuals and thus the higher the degree of volatility the economy will be exposed to 
(Gottschalk 2003). On the other hand, high inequalities restrain the demand capacity of poor 
and middle-income countries (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Reductions in income 
inequality lead to a wealthier middle class (enlarged by those coming out of the poorer 
classes), which are the most significant consumers of manufactured goods. Consequently, 
the reduction of inequalities is likely to induce an increase in private consumption and, 
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consequently, an enlargement of internal markets and higher prospects for economic growth. 
High levels of inequality may also impede the establishment of pro-poor trade policies and 
emphasise possible negative distributional impacts caused by international economic shocks 
(McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001; Winters 2002; Wood 1994). 
This body of literature has not only emphasised the market-distortive effects of inequality but 
has also shown how persistently high levels of income inequality may affect economic 
efficiency through losses in individual productivity. Notably, high income inequality may result 
in reductions in the stock of human capital available in each economy when it leads to the 
persistence of illiteracy and poor health among disadvantaged groups. Dilapidated stocks of 
human capital will, in turn, decrease individuals’ capacity to access better jobs and higher 
incomes. This will, in turn, reflect in the countries’ inability to pursue higher rates of economic 
growth (Galor and Zeira 1993; Perotti 1993; Ribero and Nuñez 1999; Saint-Paul and Verdier 
1992). 
Several other studies have shown that persistently high levels of inequality not only affect the 
economy and individual productivity but can also have profoundly negative effects on 
societies through effects on discontent and social cohesion. Most of this literature has 
focused on the effects of inequality on social outcomes related to stability, notably crime and 
other forms of social and political conflict. The reasoning behind these results is that the 
persistence of inequalities among certain socioeconomic groups may increase social 
discontent and, consequently, the propensity of individuals and/or groups to engaging in 
criminal activities, violence and even wars. Inequality has been associated with an increased 
risk of crime (Becker 1967; Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 1998; Sala-i-Martin 1996), and 
forms of sociopolitical conflict (Gupta 1990; Lichbach 1989). Several studies have also 
shown a close association between armed conflict and income and asset inequality (Muller 
and Seligson 1987; Schock 1996), class divides (Paige 1975; Scott 1976), horizontal 
inequality between ethnic, religious and other cultural groups (Langer 2004; Murshed and 
Gates 2005; Østby 2006; Stewart 2000, 2002), relative deprivation (Gurr 1970), levels of 
polarisation (Esteban and Ray 1994; Esteban and Schneider 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2008) and ethnic fragmentation (Easterly and Levine 1997). 
What is less understood is why and when inequalities will result in the breakdown of social 
cohesion to high enough levels that result in violence. While social exclusion and inequality 
persist in many countries across the world, only a handful of these countries have 
experienced or will experience violence and conflict. This is because the ‘primary causal 
sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization 
of the discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and 
actors’ (Gurr 1970: 13). I have argued elsewhere that two factors may explain the 
relationship between inequality and the ‘actualisation’ of discontent into violence (Justino 
2013). The first is the nature and structure of inequalities within each society, which will 
determine the point at which inequality will be seen as a sufficiently serious infringement of 
the social contract between states and citizens or between citizens themselves. The second 
is the type of structures in place at the level of the state and markets – and also, 
fundamentally, at the level of the civil society – that may either reduce the propensity or 
create the space and opportunity for certain actors to resort to violence and conflict as a 
strategy to manage social, economic and political differences. This begs the question: How 
does inequality shape social cooperation and collective action across societies? 
  
9 
2 Inequality, social cooperation and collective 
action 
A recent body of research has argued that the emergence of inclusive and democratic 
societies is largely explained by how institutions manage social diversity and different 
interests at historical transition points (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2002; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). North et al. (2009) refer to the 
importance of ‘open access’ societies, where citizens are treated in similar ways, limiting the 
emergence of exclusion, grievances and their translation into violent outcomes. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) discuss the role of ‘inclusive institutions’ in promoting virtuous cycles of 
innovation, economic growth and peace. Besley and Persson (2011) refer to the significance 
of ‘common interests’ and the management of differences in the transition towards more 
inclusive development processes. A common thread across this literature is that violence will 
emerge when inequalities result in ‘extractive’ institutional processes that promote exclusion 
and further dysfunctional inequalities. 
Inequalities affect not only how state institutions function, but also how local self-governing 
institutions deliver local public goods. Notably, high levels of inequality may lead to local 
institutional failures when resources and power are captured by elites at the expense of 
poorer and more vulnerable sections of the population (Bardhan 2005; Ostrom 1990; 
Platteau 2004). These effects are of particular concern in developing countries where local 
governing institutions (formal or informal) are central to the organisation of societies when 
governments are unable to provide adequate public goods, and insurance, credit and other 
markets are absent (Fafchamps 1992; Ostrom 1990; Rosenzweig 1988; Townsend 1994). 
Collective action is also an important determinant of poverty and development processes in 
these contexts (Akerlof 1976; Coleman 1990; Durlauf 2006; Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock 
2006; North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Putnam 1993; Woolcock 1998). The success of local 
collective action is, in turn, dependent on the bonds of social cooperation within and across 
communities (Barrett 2005; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein 2009). 
Inequalities are likely to affect profoundly the social fabric of local communities and their 
ability to cooperate. Inequalities may affect social relations between family members, 
neighbours and acquaintances, how communities relate internally and with other 
communities, and the functioning of local citizen organisations and their relation with state-
level institutions. I explore below three mechanisms whereby inequalities may affect 
collective action, through their impact on: (i) individual motivations to participate in collective 
action groups; (ii) group-level cooperation and trust; and (iii) the efficiency and coordination 
of collective organisations. 
2.1 Inequality and motivations for individual participation in collective action 
groups 
Income inequality may affect individual decisions to participate in collective organisations. 
First, standard median-voter models predict that when inequality in a certain society is high 
the median voter is located closer to the vast majority of poor voters. In those circumstances, 
policies targeted at the median voter should be pro-poor (Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
However, this result is highly dependent on the political influence of those at the top of the 
distribution, and the net effect of inequality on political and civil participation will be shaped 
by the interests of the elites (Piketty 1996). The reality observed in most high-inequality 
countries is that the provision of public goods tends to systematically exclude the poor (World 
Bank 2003a). Moreover, the link between inequality and political participation often creates 
barriers – when the poor cannot afford to vote or are bought out by richer votes – that 
prevent the poor from voicing their demands in equal weight to the rich and participating in 
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equal terms in forms of collective organisation (Lijphart 1997). Tilly’s (1998) work was one of 
the first theoretical efforts to systematically analyse the persistence of inequalities caused by 
differences between societal categories. ‘Durable’ inequalities between different social or 
political categories arise ‘because people who control access to value-producing resources 
solve pressing organizational problems by means of categorical distinctions. Inadvertently or 
otherwise, those people set up systems of social closure, exclusion, and control’ (Tilly 1998: 
8). The persistence of political inequalities among disadvantaged groups implies, in turn, the 
exclusion of large fractions of the population from the development process, resulting in 
lower levels of redistribution (Piketty 1996), and creating barriers to the trickle-down of the 
potential benefits of economic growth to the whole population (Datt and Ravallion 1992). 
However, in some circumstances, elites may have a sufficiently high interest in promoting 
civic participation. This may be the case when exclusion may threaten the status quo of elites 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003), or when societies have a relatively high 
tolerance for inequality due to high expectations that they will do better in the future – a 
phenomenon Hirschman (1981) famously described as the ‘tunnel effect’. The net effect of 
inequality of participation in this case is a priori unclear, and depends on perceptions of 
inequality and interactions between elite and citizen interests. 
Second, inequalities may also affect individual aspirations and expectations. It is possible 
that some levels of inequality may result in higher aspirations and expectations, notably in 
societies where the ‘tunnel effect’ operates. In this case, individual engagement in collective 
action may be seen as a way of climbing the ladder and achieving aspirations for higher 
individual welfare. Recent studies have, however, shown a link between high inequalities and 
low aspirations (Genicot and Ray 2014; Ray 2006). This effect may be shaped by the 
persistence of self-fulfilling beliefs (Bourdieu 1986) or identity-based preferences (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000), which result in individuals at the bottom of the distribution internalising 
their inability to climb the ladder and, as a result, assuming behaviours that keep them at the 
bottom. Aspirations and expectations are, in particular, shaped by family and immediate 
social circumstances, which tend to transmit values, wealth, tastes and beliefs through peer-
effects and across generations (Bowles et al. 2006). One channel is wealth inheritances, 
which, in the presence of imperfect credit markets, result in dynasties with little initial wealth 
facing limited investment opportunities and remaining poor (Piketty 2000, 2013). Other 
channels include the transmission of productive abilities and efficient human capital 
investments across generations (Piketty 2000), the family transmission of ambition and other 
tastes conducive to high productive ability (Piketty 2000), and positive assortative matching 
whereby individuals of a certain social status and levels of skills tend to relate to (and marry) 
similar individuals (Kremer 1993). These effects may lower aspirations and expectations 
among those at the bottom of the distribution, resulting in less engagement in forms of 
collective action, such as voting (Lijphart 1997, 1999), or other forms of collective 
organisation (Cardenas 2006). 
2.2 Inequality and group-level cooperation and trust 
Social cooperation – the bonds that shape social relations and bring people together – is one 
of the most fundamental pillars of social order, responsible for how political systems, markets 
and social structures are organised, including how collective action and forms of collective 
organisation emerge (Akerlof 1976; Ostrom 1990). Social cooperation does not necessarily 
need to result in forms of collective action and organisation. But effective collective action in 
general requires a certain level of social cooperation. The development economics literature 
has provided wide-ranging evidence for the importance of norms of group-level cooperation 
and trust on several social, economic and political outcomes. Individual and household group 
membership (for instance, of race, religion and ethnic groups, local associations and so forth) 
has been shown to affect significantly human and social capital outcomes (Durlauf 1996; 
Fafchamps and Lund 2002), including the persistence of inequalities due to ‘neighbourhood’ 
effects (Durlauf 1996; Wilson 1995) and social segregation (Bowles, Loury and Sethi 2014). 
The norms, preferences and beliefs that shape social cooperation and trust have also been 
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shown to be central to how people relate to each other, how collective action emerges and 
how citizens engage with state and non-state organisations (Algan and Cahuc 2010; 
Attanasio, Barr, Cardenas, Genicot and Meghir 2012; Bernard, Dercon and Taffesse 2011; 
Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000; Knack and Keefer 1997; Ray 2006). Social cooperation is also 
viewed as key to political and social stability (Varshney 2002; World Bank 2011). Group-level 
trust and cooperation are therefore likely to be central mechanisms to understanding how 
inequality affects collective action. 
There is now a substantial literature on the formation of group cooperation (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981; Bowles and Gintis 2011; Gambetta 1988) and trust (Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Soutter 2000; Karlan, Möbius, Rosenblat and Szeidl 2009). While few 
studies to date have offered a systematic analysis of which causal mechanisms might 
explain why inequalities (and what inequalities) may sometimes break group cooperation and 
trust, recent literature has suggested that high levels of inequality may affect social 
preferences around trust, altruism and reciprocity (Attanasio et al. 2012; Bowles and Gintis 
2011; Cox 2004; Gambetta 1988; Thöni, Tyran and Wengström 2012), preferences for 
egalitarianism (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan 2012) and individual 
beliefs grounded on people’s expectations (about the behaviour of others and about future 
outcomes) (Manski 2004; Ray 2006; Schelling 1966). These behavioural channels are in turn 
likely to vary across gender, age, ethnicity, religion, caste and class (Alesina and LaFerrara 
2005; Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2005; Besley, Coate and Loury 1993; Eckel and 
Grossman 2001; Habyarimana et al. 2009), either leading to more inclusive local 
organisations or to further entrenching existing structural inequalities (Bowles et al. 2014. 
The net effect is a priori ambiguous and likely to depend on the levels of inequality observed 
within groups and between groups. 
While some levels of heterogeneity between groups may facilitate collective action, 
particularly when elites may benefit from the collective good (Olson 1965), high levels of 
heterogeneity within groups (across ethnic and wealth levels) have been shown to reduce 
group cooperation at the local level (Alesina and LaFerrara 2005; Bardhan 2005; Miguel and 
Gugerty 2005). For instance, Alesina and LaFerrara (2002) have shown that that 
interpersonal trust is lower in communities with higher income inequality in the USA. Nunn 
and Wantchekon (2011) have traced the origins of the relationship between group 
inequalities and trust in Africa to the slave trade, which appears to still shape current 
associations between high inequality and low levels of trust at the community level. This 
literature suggests that more homogeneous groups are more likely to exhibit stronger levels 
of cooperation and trust. 
However, internally homogeneous groups may also be characterised by forms of 
‘parochialism’ (Bowles and Gintis 2004, 2011) when inequalities between groups are 
significant, leading to suspicion and discrimination against ‘other’ groups. In these cases, it is 
possible that high levels of inequality across different groups or communities will enhance 
collective action within those groups that will further increase the gap between different 
groups in the population. Anti-migrant attitudes or violence against non-native groups are 
examples of this phenomenon – what was described elsewhere as the ‘dark side of social 
capital’ (see Schelling 1966). Phenomena such as this may result in reductions in inter-group 
cooperation as different social groups drift apart (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith 1996; Kranton 1996). This point was made in Piketty (2013), who 
discussed how the increasing disconnection between the top 1 per cent and the rest of the 
population in several developed countries might result in further wealth accumulation at the 
top, and the exclusion of most of the population from the benefits of economic growth. 
Another example of inequalities between groups leading to reductions in between-group 
cooperation and trust is that of local segregation into unequal communities. Benabou (1993), 
for instance, has shown that the provision of public goods and education opportunities are 
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greater in richer neighbourhoods than in the poorer neighbourhoods due to increased social 
segregation whereby higher wages for skilled labour and increases in land prices exclude 
lower income groups from moving into better-off neighbourhoods. As segregation is practiced 
by upper income groups, the cost of acquisition of human capital rises in poorer 
neighbourhoods due both to the deterioration of public goods and the lack of spillover effects 
that usually originate from a larger pool of skilled labour. In a seminal paper, Cutler and 
Glaeser (1997) found that a one-standard-deviation decrease in segregation would eliminate 
one-third of the black–white differential in schooling and employment outcomes in the USA. 
Other studies have suggested that neighbourhood characteristics, such as average 
educational level of adults, contribute to poverty-inducing factors such as teenage pregnancy 
and low-level schooling achievement among the young (Durlauf 2000). Wilson (1995) 
famously argued that residential segregation may contribute towards labour market 
discriminations and, consequently, to differences in initial opportunities between those 
individuals that live in better areas and those that live in less desirable residential districts 
(see also Sethi and Somamathan 2004). Furthermore, because credit constraints tend to 
accentuate forms of residential segregation, credit imperfections, local segregation and 
discrimination can operate together and lead to a cumulative process of socially inefficient 
persistent inequality (Piketty 2000). Low levels of cooperation and trust between groups may, 
in turn, affect the effectiveness and outcomes of forms of collective action. 
2.3 Efficiency and coordination of collective organisations in the presence of 
inequalities 
In addition to individual participation and group cooperation and trust, inequality may also 
affect the efficiency of collective action organisations in achieving common goals and their 
ability to coordinate collective action in ways that minimise free-riding and moral hazard 
problems. First, high levels of inequality within collective action groups or organisations could 
lead to bargaining disputes over the benefits of collective action, resulting in less than 
efficient outcomes, because most of the energy and time of the group is spent in resolving 
conflicts (Bardhan 2005). Second, negotiation and enforcement costs in cooperative 
arrangements may increase when inequality within the group is high (Bardhan 2005; Miguel 
and Gugerty 2005). In particular, monitoring free-riding and moral hazard behaviours may be 
more difficult to achieve in heterogeneous groups (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Ben-David 1998). 
These effects are, however, dependent on the interests of elites. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) and North et al. (2009) have argued, respectively, that ‘inclusive institutions’ and 
‘open access societies’ may emerge when they are in the interests of elites. Similar 
mechanisms could be at play at the level of local collective action organisations if the elites 
that participate in these groups have a vested interest in the outcome of collective action 
(Bardhan 2005; Olson 1965). In that case, it is possible that inequalities may not matter 
much for the efficiency of the group. However, it is also possible that elites may either 
engage in rent-seeking activities or disengage from the group. Banerjee et al. (2001) show 
that within-group inequality has resulted in lower efficiency in sugar cooperatives in 
Maharashtra, India, due to rent-seeking behaviour from wealthier cooperative members, who 
maintain low sugar prices in order to benefit (economic and socially) from rents that are 
generated by the cooperative. Elites may also stop using local public goods (such as schools 
and health care), leading to forms of neighbourhood or community segregation (Bardhan 
2005). 
One particularly relevant example is when elite interests in highly unequal groups lead to 
failures in how collective action may be used in redistribution demands. As discussed above, 
Piketty (1996) shows how rises in inequality may be accompanied by reductions in 
redistribution. These effects could, for instance, explain the prevalence of inefficient, non-
progressive or even regressive fiscal systems. In a survey of tax incidence in a sample of 20 
developing and in transition countries, Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) found that tax 
systems were progressive in just over a third of cases. About a fifth of all cases were 
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regressive and the remainder neutral. Implementing progressive tax systems in developing 
countries is very difficult, given the existence of weak governments, influenced by elites and 
affected by corruption, political interests, the persistence of high tax evasion and the 
existence of very small taxable income bases (Newbery and Stern 1987; Radian 1980). 
Inequalities may exacerbate this situation due to failures in the coordination of collective 
action for more redistribution. 
3 Final remarks: a new research agenda? 
The sections above discuss how income inequality may affect collective action through 
changes in individual motivations to participate in collective organisations, in norms of group 
cooperation and trust, and in the efficiency and coordination of collective action. These are 
important effects because they may in turn weaken the role of collective action in reducing 
inequalities further in the future. Historically, local communities, citizens’ associations and 
several other types of local organisations have played important roles in social demands for 
redistributive policies, social justice and the protection of vulnerable population groups. But, 
paradoxically, high levels of inequality may weaken the very forces that may curtail unjust 
social, economic and political differences across the world. In other words, high levels of 
income and wealth inequality may result in the prevalence of norms and institutions that will 
perpetuate inequalities further. Addressing this issue is key to debates on economic 
development because the relationship between rising income inequality, social cooperation 
and collective action is central to understanding how societies transition to inclusiveness, or 
remain trapped in vicious cycles of underdevelopment and sociopolitical instability. 
These complex relationships remain, however, under-researched. In particular, several 
fundamental but so far unanswered questions emerge from the discussion above: 
(i) What levels of income inequality cause the breakdown of participation, social 
cooperation and the efficiency of collective action organisations? 
(ii) What types of inequality matter for collective action? 
(iii) How do the effects of inequality vary across the internal structure and organisation of 
different collective action groups? 
(iv) How do we identify empirically the causal mechanisms that underlie the theoretical – 
and a priori unclear – association between income inequality and local collective 
action? 
The discussion in this paper emphasised the potential role of income inequality in shaping 
collective action, but had less to say about the levels of inequality that may matter. Olson 
(1965) argued that some level of inequality may lead to more collective action in the 
provision of pure public goods because the better-off members of the group (those with a 
higher share of the income pie) would have a vested interest in the increased provision of the 
good. At the same time, a higher share of incomes and wealth ensures that elites contribute 
towards the setting up of the collective action group by compensating them for initial costs 
(which are typically borne by elites) (see also Wade 1988). Others, such as Banerjee et al. 
(2001), have documented the negative externalities that may result in the provision of 
collective goods when inequalities between members of the group are high. It is, therefore, 
likely that the effects of inequality on collective action depend on the levels of initial 
inequality. The model developed in Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2006) illustrates some 
of these points in the case of the management of common property resources. Further 
research is needed across other different forms of collective action. 
In addition to levels, different types of inequality may also matter differently to collective 
action. Inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon and it is therefore likely that not all 
dimensions of inequality shape collective action in similar ways. It is possible to envisage a 
14 
situation in which some levels of income inequality may spur collective action because they 
compensate elites for the costs of initiating collective action (as in Olson 1965). In this case, 
elites benefit because they take a higher share of the collective good. Those at the bottom of 
the distribution also benefit because the collective good yields positive externalities. In other 
words, those at the bottom of the distribution are better off than in a situation where the 
collective good is not produced. But income or wealth inequality may lead to opposite effects 
when wealth differentials exist alongside other dimensions of inequality such as caste, class 
or ethnic-based discrimination, whereby elites are able to manipulate the structures of 
collective action in order to appropriate most of the gains at the cost of other members of the 
group (Banerjee et al. 2001; Gaspart and Platteau 2006). Social distances between 
members of collective action groups may also affect individual participation in the group and 
the structures of within-group cooperation (Cardenas 2006; Gaspart and Platteau 2006). To 
date, limited research has been conducted on how different types of inequalities may interact 
in shaping the functioning of collective action arrangements. 
In terms of the internal structure and organisation of collective action groups, the paper has 
implicitly assumed that collective action groups are mostly self-governing and contributions 
are voluntary. But the structure of the collective action group may affect substantially the 
relationship between inequality and collective action in two ways: (i) whether the group is 
self-regulatory or whether a common authority can enforce taxation and use that to provide 
public goods (Baland and Platteau 2006; Bardhan et al. 2006), or (ii) whether contributions to 
the collective good are voluntary or regulated (Baland and Platteau 2006; Janssen and 
Ostrom 2006). In addition, the aim of the collective action group may also shape how income 
inequality may affect collective action through the mechanisms discussed in the previous 
section. For instance, trade unions and common-property-resources user groups may act in 
entirely different ways because the collective good that emerges from these different forms of 
collective action may yield different externalities. Trade unions result in a collective good 
(higher salaries) with positive externalities. In this case, it is possible that inequalities within 
the group matter less than in the case of common property resources, where negative 
externalities in the use of the resource (lower availability of local resources) may facilitate 
appropriation by the wealthier and more powerful (Bardhan et al. 2006; Janssen and Ostrom 
2006). The question of how the effects of income inequality on collective action may vary 
across different types of groups is a very compelling area of future research as different 
forms of collective action may produce an array of development outcomes in different parts 
of the world. 
Finally, the answers to the questions above are partly constrained by empirical limitations, 
particularly in terms of the availability of data that can be compared across countries. Despite 
recent improvements, the systematic compilation of data on inequality still faces considerable 
challenges (particularly beyond a handful of mostly developed countries). Data on collective 
action are also difficult to find beyond a small number of countries, limiting how we can 
currently address the questions discussed above. The analysis of the causal mechanisms 
that may shape the relationship between inequality and collective action presents further 
difficulties. However, recent developments in behavioural economics, and a closer 
relationship between economics, sociology and social psychology research, has offered new 
insights into foundations of social cooperation, trust and individual preferences for pro-social 
norms (see Cardenas and Carpenter 2008). In addition, new links between behavioural data 
and socioeconomic outcomes indicate that progress in this area of research may be 
possible. Data on collective organisations are also being collected more systematically in 
large socioeconomic surveys – such as the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 
and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program – showing a promising avenue for 
future comparative empirical work across countries. 
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